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Regional elections have often been perceived as inferior elections (Schakel & Jeffery 2013:324) 
that voters primarily interpret through the prism of politics at the national level (Erk & Swenden  
2010). If regional and national elections are held simultaneously this would reinforce the 
perception that there is less at stake in regional elections (Maddens & Fabre, 2009). That is why 
some politicians as well as political scientists raise objections when national and regional 
assemblies are elected on the same day. The basic tenet of their criticism is that simultaneous 
elections dishonor the regional level. Regional elections are reduced to second-order elections. 
But to what extent is this really true? 
First of all, this is an interesting socio-political question. According to some politicians and 
political scientists simultaneous elections would put the sub-states in the shade and leave no 
room for regional peculiarities. Moreover it would mean a profound weakening of democracy. In 
simultaneous elections, regional and national issues are constantly mixed up by politicians and 
voters. As a result it is difficult to hold politicians accountable for the policy decisions that they 
make (Maddens & Fabre, 2009).  
Other scholars state that this accountability has nothing to do with the coinciding of these 
elections but with federalism as such. At first this seems somewhat counterintuitive because the 
general notion about federalism is that it increases the democratic character of policy-making. 
By devolving competences to a lower level, government is closer to the people and policy-
makers can be more responsive to the particular preferences of the citizens (Oates 1999: 1120). 
In other words, federalism enhances democratic accountability. The distance between politicians 
and citizens is smaller which makes it easier for the latter to evaluate the political work that is 
done. Politicians can better explain why some policy choices are made and because of the closer 
relation between politicians and citizens critical comments are picked up more easily by the 
policy makers.  
But different scholars have emphasized that democratic accountability is not unproblematic in 
the context of multilevel governance (Anderson 2006: 459; Downs 1999). They acknowledge that 
on one hand it could be expected that a federal state is conducive to accountability because 
decentralization brings the policy making process closer to citizens. But on the other hand, 
competences are often only partially decentralized in federal states which makes it difficult for 
voters to determine who’s responsible for what (Joanis 2008). This intertwined federalism is the 
reason why some scholars draw the inference that as political decentralization increases, the 
possibility to hold governments accountable for political outcomes decreases (Anderson 2006, p. 
459). If voters mix up the national and regional level we could conclude that federations suffer 
from a ‘democratic deficit’. Because this would crowd out distinct judgments about the issues 
that are at stake on the different governmental levels. Democratic accountability requires 
transparency. If voters don’t know who’s responsible for what, the performance of a government 
cannot be effectively monitored and evaluated. 
However, the hierarchical relation between national and regional elections does not only have an 
interesting socio-political dimension, it is also interesting because it refers to a popular topic 
within political science: the second-order election (SOE) model. Multi-level elections have often 
been studied based on this model (Reif & Schmitt 1980; Pallarés & Keating 2003; Hough & 
Jeffery 2003). 
The core assumption of the SOE-model is that voters perceive regional elections as less 
important than national elections (Schakel and Dandoy 2013:p.5-6; Schakel & Jeffery 2013:324). 
According to SOE-model regional elections do not have their own dynamics but should be seen 
as a function of politics at the centre. But is the regional level really subordinate to the national 
level? And to what extent are the different governmental levels mixed up in a federal state? 
In this article we will examine this question. Not by looking at voting behavior (Schakel & Jeffery 
2013; Dandoy & Schakel 2013) or by analyzing how media report on elections (De Vreese 2003), 
but by analyzing the third factor that is important for the understanding of this phenomenon: 
the parties and politicians. The way that they communicate during election-campaigns also 
determines how media and voters think about the rank order of elections (Reif & Schmitt 
1980:14). For example, if politicians frame regional elections as a national test, media and voters 
will be inclined to do so too. Thus, the analysis of how politicians communicate during 
campaigns may be crucial in our understanding of the election process in multi-level states. For 
instance, it may give us insight in the impact of politicians on the fact that regional elections are 
sometimes considered as ‘second-order’ by voters.  
In order to test the second order theory/our research question we will analyze tweets of political 
candidates during the campaign for the 2014 regional and federal elections in Belgium. Both the 
elections for the parliaments of the sub-states and the national level were elected on the same 
day. These simultaneous campaigns provided a unique opportunity to test the rank order of the 
various elections (Dandoy 2013:966). Moreover, Belgium is an interesting case because, 
according to Downs (1999), democratic accountability has decreased due to the decentralization 
and the high amount of governments. 
We will proceed as follows. First, we will elaborate on the rank order of elections in multi-level 
states. Next,  we will  describe the Belgian case and pay attention to the concept of simultaneous 
elections. Afterwards, we will highlight the used methodology. Finally,  the results will be 
presented. 
 
Rank order of elections 
When campaigns for the different governmental levels of a federal state coincide, the relation 
between the national and regional level can take three forms. First, of all the regional elections 
can be overshadowed by the national level. Secondly, the campaign at the national level can be 
subordinated to regional party competition. Finally, the regional and federal level can function as 
two separate electoral arenas. 
The idea that regional elections are overshadowed by national elections is consistent with the 
second order election (SOE) theory.  The SOE-model was developed by Reif & Schmitt (1980) 
and was based on the first elections for the European Parliament in 1979. Reif and Schmitt found 
that the electoral outcomes of the European elections were determined by domestic politics. 
Hence European elections were considered as second order elections. Because there is less at 
stake in secondary elections turnout is lower. In countries where voting is not compulsory 
citizens may not cast ballots because such elections are considered as less important. Small and 
new parties are more popular in secondary elections. In national elections – when more is at 
stake – voters prefer large established parties to small parties which are seen as a risk. Finally, 
parties that are in the national government tend to lose at second-order elections because the 
popularity of governing parties declines after a period of time. According to Reif and Schmitt 
(1980:8) this second orderness does not only account for European elections, but also for other 
elections. By-elections, “second chamber” elections, municipal or regional elections are also 
subordinate to the first-order elections and considered less important as well. That is why 
regional elections have often been studied by making use of this SOE-model (Pallarés & Keating 
2003; Hough & Jeffery 2003). 
Economic voting is another much used theoretical framework to study electoral behavior in 
multi-level environments (Erk & Swenden 2010:193). Regional electoral outcomes are seen as a 
an appreciation of the statewide economy. For instance, if the economy is in decline, the 
incumbent federal parties will lose at the regional elections (Erk & Swenden 2010:193). In other 
words, the condition of the national – not the subnational - economy is seen as the most 
important factor to explain regional voting behavior.  
The central tenet in the SOE-model as well as in the framework of economic voting is that the 
national level is more important than the regional level during election times. Based on this logic 
we can expect that national campaigns will overshadow regional campaigns. However, empirical 
research on both models shows that reality could be much more nuanced. Scholars who have 
worked with both models came up with mixed findings: some found that the national level 
dominates the regional level, some studies suggest that there is no hierarchy and other scholars 
turn the assumed hierarchy upside down. 
Recently, scholars (Schakel & Jeffery 2013; Erk & Swenden 2010; Dandoy & Schakel 2013) have 
been emphasizing that the SOE-model has constraints for the study of regional elections. Large 
N-scale research shows that the SOE-model has only limited merits in explaining regional 
election outcomes (Schakel and Jeffery 2013:338). This suggests that the regional electoral arena 
stands on its own and is not automatically mixed up with the national level. But the second-order 
model was not only empirically challenged, it was questioned on a conceptual level as well 
(Dandoy & Schakel 2013:8; Erk & Swenden 2010:194). In order to understand the electoral 
process at the regional level, it  should be treated on its own terms and not as a function of 
national elections (Schakel & Jeffery 2013:4). The SOE-model was probably copied too outright 
to elections within federal states. This conceptual frame was in the first place designed to 
understand voting behavior at European elections but was without any further reflections 
translated to the relation between the national and regional elections. (Schakel & Jeffery 
2013:326).  
Both the empirical findings that contradict with the SOE-model and the fact that research 
findings may have been influenced by the way that regional elections have been approached, 
lead to the assumption that regional and national elections are not mixed up. This is also what 
some empirical studies on economic voting suggest. Some scholars show that the results of 
regional elections are not influenced by national, but subnational economic conditions (see 
Anderson 2006:451). This leads to the assumption that the regional level must be considered as a 
governmental level that is not subordinate to the national level, but as a level on its own.  
A third group of scholars even goes a step further and states that voting in national elections can 
be informed by what happens at the regional level. Being in power at the regional level 
obtaining electoral success in subnational elections as well as subnational economic conditions 
may influence national politics (Swenden and Maddens 2009:8; Orth 2001 cited in Anderson 
2006:451; Schakel and Jeffery 2013, p. 339). Especially in strong regions, in terms of the 
competences they have, scholars are expecting a distinct regional dynamic (Swenden and 
Maddens 2009:1; Schakel & Jeffery 2013:327). With regard to the Belgian case, Deschouwer 
(2008) observes a regionalization of national elections. That is also what Dandoy (2013) 
concludes after analyzing the congruence between regional and national elections in Belgium. 
Although his measurements show that voters vote for the same parties in regional and national 
elections, he does not automatically consider this as an evidence for nationalization. This 
congruence can also mean that national elections are regionalized.   
 Vertical simultaneity 
The importance of timing for the rank order 
The timing of regional elections is often mentioned as an important variable in the perceived 
rank order of elections. When regional and national elections are held on the same day (vertical 
simultaneity), the stakes in a regional election decrease (Jeffery and Hough 2006; Dandoy and 
Schakel 2013:283; Swenden en maddens 2009:21). But there is only limited research that 
explicitly focusses on simultaneous elections. Fabre and Maddens (2009) made a report on 
simultaneous elections in which they list the federations where simultaneous elections are held 
and weigh the pros and cons of vertical simultaneity. They argue that it is very exceptional that 
federal and sub-state elections are held simultaneously (Fabre & Maddens 2009:4). That 
probably explains why coinciding elections have not been studied a lot. 
Vertical simultaneity is sometimes mentioned briefly in research that examines regional elections. 
In their large-N test of the applicability of the second-order theory on regional elections, Schakel 
and Jeffery (2013) for instance included 349 regional elections that were held simultaneously 
with national elections. They found that these coinciding elections did not conform to second-
order expectations. The most extensive analysis of vertical simultaneous elections is done by 
Romanova (2013). She tested the principle of cyclicality of the second order election theory by 
looking at simultaneous elections in Belgium, France, Sweden and Ukraine. According to this 
principle second-order effects would be minimal when elections are held simultaneously, hence, 
regional electoral scores reflect national scores. As expected she found that regional and 
national voting are congruent when both elections are held on the same day and national 
elections set the tone. 
Based on this literature we can expect that the regional campaign will be overshadowed by the 
campaign on the national level . 
But according to Jeffery and Hough (2009) the level of regional authority and the existence of 
territorial cleavages may influence the level of independence of regional elections from the 
national level. If a lot of competences devolved to the regions and voters have a higher level of 
identification with a region, the perceived importance of regional elections may rise. As the 
Belgian federation meets both conditions, we may expect that the regional and the national level 
can function as two separate electoral  arenas or even that the campaign at the national level will 
be subordinate to the regional party competition.  
Vertical simultaneity in the Belgian case 
Belgium is an interesting case to study the impact of vertical simultaneity because it is one of the 
rare cases where it has occurred several times. In 1995, 1999 and 2014 regional elections 
coincided with federal elections. Up to date, this co-occurrence was arbitrary and not because 
the law imposed vertical simultaneity. In this paragraph we will give an outline of the Belgian 
case and focus on the aspect of vertical simultaneity. In order to understand the relation 
between national and subnational elections an overview of the complex institutional design is 
needed. 
The Belgian federation consists of a federal level and six sub-states. There are two different types 
of sub-states, regions and communities. This asymmetric construction was the result of two 
distinct drivers of regionalism. The leading Flemish politicians insisted on more cultural 
autonomy which resulted in three language communities, Flemish-, French- and German-
speaking. These communities do not follow a strictly territorial logic because the French as well 
as the Flemish community are both competent in the 19 communities of the Brussels area. In 
contrast, the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels region have a strictly territorial nature. The creation 
of these regions complied with the Walloon demands for autonomy in socio-economic matters 
(Swenden & Jans 2006:880).  
The competences of the regions and communities are in line with their historical roots. The 
communities have powers for matters relating to language and the individual: culture (theatre, 
libraries, audiovisual media…), sports, education, aspects of health policy (curative and preventive 
medicine) and assistance to persons (protection of youth, social welfare, child support, aid to 
families, immigrant assistant services, care of the elderly, …).  The competences of the regions are 
connected with their territory and relate to the economy in the broadest sense. The regions 
decide on employment policy, environment, agriculture, offshore fishing, regional economic 
policy, scientific research, foreign trade, town and country planning, tourism, public works, 
transport (except Belgian Railways), energy, water policy, housing and some fiscal policies (a part 
of the income tax, inheritance tax, estate tax, tax cuts for target groups and traffic tax).  
The federal authorities have the residual powers. They decide on everything that does not 
explicitally falls under the communities and the regions. The main federal competencies are 
defence, justice, police, foreign affairs, social security and the important laws in social security 
(unemployment, pensions, health insurance, except child support), substantial parts of public 
health, public debt, nuclear energy, state-owned companies (Post office and Belgian railways), 
prices and incomes policy, monetary policy and the bulk of fiscal policy.  
The sub-states and the federal level have exclusive competences. This means that only they are 
able to legislate and adopt binding acts in the fields that they have powers. There is no hierarchy 
between the norms, but not all policy domains are homogeneously assigned to a governmental 
level. Which makes it a very complex situation.  
This complexity also accounts for the subnational elections in Belgium. Not all of the subnational 
parliaments are directly elected. The parliament of the French-speaking community consists of 
19 French-speaking MPs from the Brussels parliament and all of the French-speaking MPs from 
the Walloon parliament. The parliaments of the Flemish community and Flemish region were 
merged into one Flemish parliament which means that there are no separate elections for both 
assemblies. This means that elections occur only in four of the six subnational entities: Flanders, 
the German-speaking community and the Walloon and Brussels regions (Dandoy 2013: 53). 
The first direct subnational elections were held relatively recent. Of course the parliament of the 
German-speaking community was already directly elected in 1974, four years after the first step 
in the Belgian devolution process. However, because only 0,7 percent of the total Belgian 
electorate lives in the German Community, it is considered as politically irrelevant (Dandoy 
2013:47).  The next subnational level that got a directly elected assembly was the Brussels Region 
in 1989. But the historic turning point when it comes to subnational elections is 1995. In that 
year direct elections were held for the first time in the largest regions of the country: Wallonia 
and Flanders.  
In 1995, federal and subnational elections immediately coincided. Because (except for 1995) 
subnational elections would always be held simultaneously with the European elections, the 
federal and sub-state elections coincided again in 1999. Normally it would take until 2019 before 
both elections were held simultaneously, but because the federal parliament was dissolved one 
year before the anticipated ending of the federal legislature in 2010, sub-state and federal 
elections were already held on the same day again in 2014.  
Normally both elections will coincide again in 2019 because the federal legislature was extended 
from four to five years in 2014. Thus from now on the federal MPs stay in place for the same 
time as the MPs of the subnational parliaments. But unlike the regional assemblies, the federal 
parliament can still be dissolved before the end of the legislature in case of a severe political 
crisis. Especially because of the linguistic problems between Francophones and Flemish 
politicians decided to secure an exit strategy. Early elections are seen as the ultimate solution in 
case that the Belgian decision-making process gets paralyzed. This is different for the 
subnational level where a new coalition must be found within the same parliament in case of an 
irresolvable governmental conflict.  
The possibility of a shorter federal legislature implies that vertical simultaneity is not guaranteed 
in 2019. However, there are several political parties that want to impose it legally. The coalition 
partners of the government Di Rupo I (2010-2014) decided to change the Constitution in this 
sense, although they were divided on the issue. The result is an extremely complicated decision. 
Vertical simultaneity is written down in the Constitution, but the amendment of this Article 65 
still needs to be ratified with a special majority (i.e. 2/3 of the federal parliament and 1/2 of each 
language group). If this amendment finds enough support, regional and national elections will 
always coincide. In order to guarantee such vertical simultaneity, institutional high-tech was 
needed. Especially because the federal parliament can be dissolved before the end of the five 
year legislature. In that case, elections will be organized in order to choose a parliament for the 
rest of the five year legislature. For instance, if the federal parliament is dissolved in 2018 then 
elections will be held for a parliamentary session of one year. Together with the approval of 
coinciding national and subnational elections, the sub-states would get the competence to 
decide on the duration of the legislature of their parliaments and the election date. This would 
mean that the sub-states can choose to deviate from the coinciding elections. 
This surrealistic decision-making process shows that there is a lot of disagreement on imposed 
vertical simultaneity in Belgium. The parties that are in favor of coinciding elections state that 
simultaneity is needed to cope with the inflation of elections in Belgium. Between 1999 and 2014 
there were ten elections for the federal, regional or local level. As a result, parties need to 
campaign permanently and difficult, but important, decisions are postponed to the future. The 
opponents of coinciding elections draw inspiration from the SOE-model and state that the 
regional level will be overshadowed by the national level when elections coincide. They point to 
the ‘democratic deficit’ that arises because voters will have problems to determine which 
governmental level is responsible for what. Moreover, when regional elections were organized 
for the first time, politicians explicitly chose for different election dates in order to emancipate 
the regional parliaments.   
 
Research focus & design 
Contrary to earlier research on the rank order of elections in multilevel states, this study focuses 
on politicians instead of voters or traditional media. More specifically, we focus on their 
communication behavior via social media. Especially during election times, these platforms 
provide politicians with the opportunity to communicate their agenda towards the wider public 
as well as the mass media. In particular, the micro-blogging platform Twitter has become an 
important campaigning instrument for political candidates (Kruikemeier 2014: 131). Moreover, 
Reif and Schmitt (1980: 13-14) argue that campaign efforts can influence the perceived order of 
the elections. The public is naturally focused on the elections in the first-order arena. But the 
attention of media and voters for the second-order arena can be attracted by emphasizing issues 
that are on stake at the regional level. In other words, what politicians say can influence voters 
perceptions on the hierarchy of elections. 
In this study, we investigate politicians’ Twitter messages to define whether they discuss regional 
and/or federal issues, hence, to what extent we encounter second-order elections. Our 
hypotheses are:  (H1) Regional and federal elections are mixed up by candidates when elections 
coincide. 
(H2) Federal and regional candidates primarily discuss national issues and regional regional 
issues are second-order. 
Based on these assumptions, we aim to understand to what extent regional elections are 
overshadowed by the discussion of national policy issues (or vice versa). In doing so, we focus on 
the regional and national elections in Belgium, held the 25th of May 2014. Below, we present the 
data collection procedure and analytical approach towards the Twitter data.  
Data collection 
Data collection is based on a selection of Twitter users, from which all messages were harvested 
during the four-week period preceding election day. More specifically, we departed from the 
candidate lists, constituted per party, for both the regional (Flanders) and national elections. 
From these lists, we selected candidates ranked at the top of the list (i.e. the most important 
candidates), resulting in a total of 96 candidates, of which 59 have a Twitter account. Of these 59 
candidates, 30 ran for the regional and 29 for the federal elections. Table 1 below presents an 
overview of the candidates in terms of their party membership and the governmental level they 
represent.  
Table 1 Twitter users and tweets by party and governmental level 
Party 
membership 
The Flemish level The Federal level 
Users Tweets Users Tweets 
Sp.a 4 300 3 292 
CD&V 6 1266 6 1036 
Open VLD 6 872 5 598 
N-VA 4 614 4 395 
Vlaams Belang 4 430 4 443 
Groen 5 343 4 126 
LDD / / 1 54 
PvdA 1 149 2 199 
Total 30 3974 29 3143 
 The table shows multiple candidates per party because there are six circumscriptions (hence, 
lists) for which the political parties can present candidates, both for the Flemish as well as the 
Federal elections. The populist liberal party LDD (“Lijst Dedecker”) only participated in the federal 
elections, as shown in Table 1. In addition, the small number candidates from the communist 
PvdA relates to the fact that this is a new party with no incumbent MPs. Only those candidates of 
the PvdA that had the largest chance of getting elected (according to the polls) were included in 
the researchi.  
Twitter data was captured using the open-source service yourTwapperkeeper (yTK), a commonly 
used data collection tool within social sciences (Bruns, 2012). The usernames are inserted in the 
tool as ‘keywords’, via which the collection of their messages is made possible. Afterwards, the 
datasets with Twitter messages from each of the individual users were merged and exported as 
one excel data file for further analysis. In total, the candidates posted 7117 messages from the 
25th of April to the 25th of May (until the voting bureaus officially closed). From the 59 candidates 
that are on Twitter, four did not post any tweet, hence, the 7117 messages are produced by 55 
Twitter users.   
Data analysis 
We conducted a quantitative content analysis whereby both the content of the messages and 
the users were coded. The content analysis was preceded by a manual categorization of all 
Twitter messages in order to retain the messages that were suited for quantitative content 
analysis. For example, we excluded messages that made reference to campaigning events and 
activities, hence, contained no reference to policy issues. In total, 2212 of the 7117 messages 
were included for the quantitative content analysis. 
For the analysis of the messages, we defined two key variables, i.e. (1) governmental level and (2) 
policy issue. The former variable is also applied on the Twitter users to understand similarities 
and differences in their utterances and their candidacy for the regional or the federal level. This 
variable consists of three categories, i.e. the Flemish or regional level, the federal level or a 
mixture of both levels. The ‘mixed’ category relates to the heterogeneous distribution of 
competences in Belgium. Although the sub-states and the federal level have exclusive 
competences, there is overlap between both levels. For example, both governmental levels are 
able to legislate on the domain of health policy. If a tweet mentions ‘health policy’ without any 
further details it was assigned to the mixed category. This also accounts for the tweets that 
mentioned both governmental levels. After the tweet was linked to the correct governmental 
level, it was assigned to a thematic issue category. In total, 38 policy issue categories were 
defined reflecting issues such as agriculture or education. If a tweet mentioned more than one 
issue, it got different two or more codes.  
For the politicians, we coded (1) party membership, reflecting the parties presented in Table 1 
and (2) the governmental level of their candidacy, consisting of two categories (i.e. Flemish or 
federal). In order to compare campaigning behavior of the candidates for the regional and 
federal level, we calculated a “Regional-Federal score” (from now: RF-score). This is necessary 
because the total amount of tweets varied greatly between governmental levels, parties and 
candidates. The most active candidate sent 195 tweets while the least active twitterers only 
accounted for three messages during the whole campaign. In order to cope with these large 
differences we used the RF-score. 
The RF-score denotes the extent to which politicians talk about the federal or regional level in 
their tweets.  This score is made up by a subtraction of the number of tweets on the federal level 
(TF) from the number of tweets on the regional level (TR). Subsequently, this difference is divided 
by the sum of tweets on the regional and federal level. The result is a score between -1 and +1. 
A score of +1 means that 100 percent of the tweets were about regional issues and a score of -1 
means that 100 percent of the tweets were about federal issues.    
 
        
     
     
 
 
 
 Results 
The discussion of the results starts with a chronological representation of the Twitter messages 
sent by the politicians under study, categorized by the constitutional level they represent. 
Overall, Figure 1 shows an increase in overall activity as well policy tweets towards election day 
(the 25th of May). However, in the run-up to the elections, policy related tweets drop whereas 
general traffic increases. We notice small drops in traffic during the weekends and on the 1th of 
May (i.e. Labor Day). The largest drop in Traffic is related to the death of former politician and 
Belgian prime minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. His death was announced the 15th of May and clearly 
had an impact on the election campaign.  
 
Figure 1 A timeline of politicians’ Twitter activity. *Data collection the 25th of Mai until 4 P.M. 
In general, policy tweets (i.e. the discussion of policy issues which can be related to the Flemish 
and/or the federal level) represent about one third of the politicians’ Twitter activity. In addition, 
both the federal and the Flemish level are represented equally throughout the campaign. Below, 
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we account for the differences in governmental level in relation to the Twitter users and their 
candidacy for the Flemish or the federal level.  
Rank order 
To what extent are federal and regional issues mixed up during simultaneous elections? The 
results show that almost all candidates tweet on both levels (Table 2). Only six candidates have a 
RF-score of +1 or -1. One of those six candidates can be considered as an absolute pure 
twitterer because he did not sent one message were both levels where mixed up in the same 
tweet. This mixed category accounts for 19,3% of all the tweets that were taken into 
consideration (428 of 2212 tweets). Based on the considerations above we cannot falsify 
hypothesis 1: regional and federal elections are indeed mixed up by the candidates when 
elections coincide. 
But to what extent did the federal level overshadow the regional level during the Belgian 
elections of May 25th 2014? When we look at the amount of tweets during the last month of the 
campaign, we can see that the candidates that were on the head of the lists sent 983 tweets on 
Flemish issues and 808 tweets on federal issues. This is an average of 16,7 regional and 13,7 
federal tweets per candidate. Based on these first results we could state that the campaign at the 
national level is subordinate to the regional level. But, as Table 2 shows, our dataset contains 
more candidates for the Flemish parliament than for the federal parliament. Moreover, the 
former were more active on Twitter during the campaign. This may lead to biased results if 
candidates primarily tweet on the parliamentary level they run for, which is why we analyzed the 
candidates for both levels separately and make use of the RF-score. Politicians primarily discuss 
federal issues in coinciding elections 
Table 2 Regional (R) and federal (F) tweets of the candidates for the Flemish and federal 
parliament (2014) and their RF-scores 
Candidates Flemish 
parliament 
R F 
RF-
score 
RF-
score 
party 
Candidates federal 
parliament 
R F 
RF-
score 
RF-
score 
party 
Groen #1 11 5 0.38 
 
Groen #6 4 11 -0.47 
 
Groen #2 59 5 0.84 
 
Groen #7 5 3 0.25 
 
Groen #3 12 6 0.33 
 
Groen #8 0 0 / 
 
Groen #4 10 0 1.00 
 
Groen #9 0 0 / -0.22 
Groen #5 10 2 0.67 0.70 CD&V #7 15 35 -0,40 
 
CD&V #1 69 4 0.89 
 
CD&V #8 0 10 -1.00 
 
CD&V #2 22 1 0.91 
 
CD&V #9 11 29 -0,45 
 
CD&V #3 154 41 0.58 
 
CD&V #10 15 13 0.07 
 
CD&V #4 108 14 0.77 
 
CD&V #11 31 66 -0.36 
 
CD&V #5 2 5 -0.43 
 
CD&V #12 9 9 0.00 -0.33 
CD&V #6 8 7 0.07 0.67 Open VLD #7 6 15 -0.43 
 
Open VLD #1 19 5 0.58 
 
Open VLD #8 4 4 0.00 
 
Open VLD #2 9 2 0.64 
 
Open VLD #9 26 8 0.53 
 
Open VLD #3 18 6 0.50 
 
Open VLD #10 1 2 -0.33 
 
Open VLD #4 0 0 / 
 
Open VLD #11 2 4 -0.33 0.08 
Open VLD #5 17 14 0.10 
 
N-VA #5 2 2 0.00 
 
Open VLD #6 30 10 0.50 0,43 N-VA #6 7 33 -0.65 
 
N-VA #1 109 67 0.24 
 
N-VA #7 0 14 -1.00 
 
N-VA #2 4 4 0.00 
 
N-VA #8 17 36 -0.36 -0.53 
N-VA #3 0 4 -1.00 
 
Vlaams Belang #5 4 22 -0.69 
 
N-VA #4 2 27 -0.86 0.06 Vlaams Belang #6 7 38 -0.69 
 
Vlaams Belang #1 15 11 0.12 
 
Vlaams Belang #7 0 3 -1.00 
 
Vlaams Belang #2 7 16 -0.39 
 
Vlaams Belang #8 5 6 -0.09 -0.62 
Vlaams Belang #3 7 6 0.08 
 
sp.a #5 17 37 -0.37 
 
Vlaams Belang #4 0 4 -1.00 -0.12 sp.a #6 0 0 / 
 
sp.a #1 1 27 -0.93 
 
sp.a #7 9 13 -0.18 -0.32 
sp.a #2 3 9 -0.50 
 
LDD #1 6 15 -0.43 
 
sp.a #3 24 9 0.45 
 
PvdA #2 15 28 -0.30 
 
sp.a #4 0 0 / -0.23 PvdA #3 10 7 0.18 -0.17 
PvdA #1 28 24 0.08 
 
    
 
Total 758 335 0.39 
 
Total 228 463 -0.34 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the regional candidates have an average RF-score of 0.39. Most of the 
candidates (21) have a positive score, which means that they mainly tweet about regional issues. 
One of them (Groen #4) only tweeted on regional issues and not on national issues and seven 
candidates have a negative score. Hence, only a minority seems to consider the national level 
more important than the regional level. But N-VA #3 and Vlaams Belang #4 had no attention at 
all for the regional parliament and only posted federal campaign messages. This also accounts 
for sp.a#1, apart from one tweet.  One candidate sent as many national as regional tweets.  
The national candidates have an average RF-score of -0.34. Nineteen candidates have a negative 
score which means that they mainly tweeted about federal issues. Three of them only 
concentrated on national politics and did not even mention the regional level once. Four 
candidates have a positive score but none of them only paid attention to the regional level. The 
national candidate who had the most attention for issues of the regional level was Open VLD #9. 
Finally, three national candidates mentioned both levels to the same amount. 
Based on these result we cannot conclude that the regional and the national level function as 
two separate electoral  arenas. But the regional campaign is not overshadowed by the campaign 
on the national level and the national level is not subordinate to the regional party competition 
either. Candidates for the regional parliament mainly tweet on regional issues, while national 
candidates prefer to tweet on federal issues. The absolute values of the average RF-scores for 
each level are not very high. This means that the regional and federal level are not seperated 
when elections coincide: federal and regional candidates talk about the competences of each 
other’s parliament. But there is no level that dominates the other. This means that hypothesis 2 is 
falsified. 
 
Differences between parties 
 
We did not only look at individual politicians but also aggregated the results to the party-level. 
This makes it possible to compare between parties and assess to what extent the opinion of a 
party on coinciding elections has an impact on the extent to which parties mix up campaigns. N-
VA, Vlaams Belang and CD&V are against vertical simultaneity for the reasons mentioned above 
(cf. supra, p. 10), the other parties are in favor of coinciding elections.ii The results on party-level 
give an interesting picture. We could expect that the parties that are against coinciding elections 
will try to make the difference clear between both governmental levels by minimalizing the 
overlap of the levels, while parties who are in favor of vertical simultaneity would have less 
problems with that. This expectation is confirmed if we consider the candidates for the federal 
parliament, but not for the regional parliament. Vlaams Belang, N-VA and CD&V have the 
smallest RF-scores if we look to their federal candidates. This means that they primarily focus on 
the federal level. But if we look to Flemish candidates we can see that N-VA and Vlaams Belang 
also have a lot of attention for the federal level. This is remarkable because we were expecting 
that regional candidates of N-VA and Vlaams Belang would have greater attention for regional 
issues because they believe it is important to emphasize the difference between both levels. 
As expected the federal candidates of the party Groen, which are in favor of vertical simultaneity, 
mix up both levels to a large extent. This contrasts with the green candidates on the Flemish 
level, who mainly focus on the competences of the parliament they are running for. With a RF-
score of 0,70 Groen concentrates its Twitter-communication on the regional competences more 
than the other parties.  
The socialist Sp.a mainly focuses on national issues. This is not only the case for the federal 
candidates but also for the candidates who run for Flemish parliament. The national political 
arena seems to be more important than the regional arena for the social democrats when 
elections coincide. However, we did not find RF-scores that are higher than -0,32. This means 
that the way that the national level overshadows the regional level is relatively limited, even for 
Sp.a.  
The results show that the party’s opinion on coinciding elections has no impact on the extent to 
which parties mix up campaigns. The differences we find between parties could also be the result 
of issue-ownership. According to the issue-ownership model (Petrocik, 1996), voters 
automatically identify parties with certain issues and regard them as being able to handle it 
(Petrocik, 1990:6, cited in Maddens, 1994:97). In this respect, scholars traditionally refer to 
conservative parties, which are are most credible on tax issue according to a lot of voters. As a 
result of this mechanism, parties traditionally try to put the issues that they “own” high on the 
agenda in election campaigns. “A candidate’s campaign can be understood as a ‘marketing’ 
effort: the goal is to achieve a strategic advantage by making problems which reflect owned 
issues the programmatic meaning of the election and the criteria by which voters make their 
choice.” (Pertocik, 1996:828) In other words, if a party succeeds in making issues they “own” as 
the main theme in the elections, then this party is well on the way to achieve an electoral victory 
(Budge and Farlie, 1983).  
There is not much (recent) empirical research about the issues that parties own. This is because 
issue ownership is not easy to operationalize, especially not in a multi-party system such as 
Belgium. Based on public opinion data of 2003-2004,  Walgrave and De Swert (2007) discerned 
13 issues that are owned by Flemish parties. But its relevance in 2014 is limited because issue 
ownership is dynamic and can change more rapidly than some scholars state (Walgrave, Lefevere 
and Nuytemans, 2009). Moreover the issue categories of Walgrave and De Swert (2007) do not 
completely correspond with the issue categories that were used for the coding of the tweets. 
Despite these limitations, we relied on the research of Walgrave and De Swert (2007) for the 
analysis. 
The extent to which parties emphasized the issues they own in the tweets they sent, can be 
derived from Table 3. This table provides the most prominent policy issues per party. For each of 
the parties, themes that represent at least 50% of the total amount of messages, were included. 
In this respect, the table provides insight in the popularity and variety of the different policy 
issues per party. The two smallest parties (i.e. LDD and PvdA) are not included in the table due to 
the limited collection of Twitter messages for these parties.  
Table 3 Issue priorities and variety per party 
CD&V 
Welfare 
(19%) 
Mobility & 
transport  
(11%) 
Tax policy 
(11%) 
Domestic 
economy 
(9%) 
Education 
(9%) 
Sp.a 
Social security 
(26%) 
Mobility & 
transport  
(10%) 
Environment 
(10%) 
Employment 
(9%) 
 
Open VLD 
Mobility & 
transport  
(18%) 
Domestic 
economy 
(16%) 
Tax policy 
(11%) 
Education 
(9%) 
 
N-VA 
Social security Tax policy Education Culture, sports 
& recreation  
 
 The fact that some parties focus on the regional level (especially Groen) and others on the 
national level (Vlaams Belang, N-VA and Sp.a) can only be explained by issue-ownership in the 
case of Vlaams Belang and Sp.a. The fact that the candidates for the Flemish parliament of 
Vlaams Belang mainly focus on national issues instead of Flemish issues is because it is 
important to focus their campaign on immigration, homeland security and state reform. All these 
issues belong to the national level which shows that the regional campaign of Vlaams Belang is 
overshadowed by the national level. The same reasoning applies to the social-democratic party 
sp.a which has a good reputation on social security. Table 3 shows that Sp.a-candidates tweeted 
a lot on social security, which is mainly a national competence. 
As social security is not owned by the N-VA, their relatively strong emphasis on federal issues 
cannot be explained by issue-ownership.  This also accounts for the strong Flemish focus of 
Groen. Notwithstanding the fact that education is an issue that is owned by CD&V, candidates of 
Groen paid most attention to this Flemish competence during the campaign.  
 
Incumbency past 
 
Finally, we elaborate on the impact of the parliamentary past of the candidates. Eight of the 
candidates for the Flemish parliament were MP in the federal parliament before the elections of 
(26%) (14%) (10%) (9%) 
Vlaams 
Belang 
Immigration 
(21%) 
Homeland 
security 
(16%) 
State reform 
(16%) 
  
Groen 
Education 
(18%) 
Mobility & 
transport  
(11%) 
Welfare 
(10%) 
Environment 
(9%) 
Tax policy 
(6%) 
2014 and one federal candidate was Flemish MP before the electionsiii. To what extent does this 
past incumbency status determine the level that candidates are tweeting on? Is it more 
determining than the parliament they are running for? This seems to be the case for MPs with a 
Flemish past, but not for MPs with a federal past. This means that we cannot state that the 
parliamentary past is more important than the parliament that candidates are running for. 
The nineteen candidates who were member of the Flemish parliament before the elections have 
an RF-score of 0,47, which is clearly higher than the RF-score of the candidates for the Flemish 
parliament. By excluding the eight regional candidates who were in the federal parliament before 
the elections, hence looking only at the Flemish incumbents, the relative amount of attention for 
the regional parliament increases. In other words, the regional level seems to be more important 
for Flemish incumbents than for Flemish candidates. 
This impact of the parliamentary past was not confirmed if we focus on the 27 federal 
incumbents. Those MPs have a RF-score of -0,34. This is exactly the same RF-score as the 
candidates for the federal parliament. This means that their incumbency past seems to have no 
impact. In other words, the federal level does not seem to be more important for federal 
incumbents than for federal candidates. 
 Conclusion 
This paper tested the often heard assumption that regional elections must be seen as a function 
of politics at the centre. This means that regional campaigns are overshadowed by national 
issues especially when national and regional elections coincide. This was verified by analyzing the 
campaign tweets of 59 Flemish politicians who run for the regional or national parliament in the 
simultaneous elections of 2014 in Belgium.  
This article has shown that the national and regional level function as two separate electoral 
arena’s when elections are held simultaneously. Regional and national candidates mix up both 
levels , but there is not one level that dominates the other. This is a very interesting result, not 
least because we analyzed coinciding elections. Based on earlier research (Romanova, 2013), we 
can assume that the congruence between campaigns that are held simultaneously is larger than 
when elections are held at different moments. Hence, if the regional level is not overshadowed 
by the national level during coinciding elections there is a good chance that this is also not the 
case in separate elections which are more common in federations. Thus the study of the 
coinciding elections in Belgium is interesting in our understanding of the SOE-model. 
Yet, we must emphasize that Belgium is a specific case. According to the Regional Authority 
Index (RAI) the Flemish government has a very large regional autonomy. Only the German 
federation is ranked higher than Belgium on the RAI (Hooghe et al., 2010). Moreover, our 
findings depend on messages of individual politicians with a Twitter account. This probably 
generates some bias because Twitter cannot be equated to the overall election campaign, which 
is conducted through mainstream media as well. Twitter traffic during election times is related to 
mainstream media events, such as televised debates (Larsson & Moe, 2012; Bruns & Burgess, 
2011). In this respect, Twitter is referred to as a “backchannel” through which traditional content 
is distributed and discussed. For politicians in particular, the question remains to what extend 
and how their use of Twitter is linked to the traditional media agenda.   
What does this research learn us about the alleged democratic deficit in multilevel states? If it is 
true that voters mix up the national and regional level, hence governments can’t be held 
accountable for political outcomes, than politicians are probably not to blame. In their campaign 
tweets politicians mainly focus on the level they are running for, even when elections are held 
simultaneously. This begs the question if the traditional media shouldn’t be held accountable for 
mixing up governmental levels.   
Further research is needed to get a clearer picture of the way that politicians mix up 
governmental levels. Instead of focusing on the popular candidates that are on the head of the 
list it could be interesting to include candidates who are less important for the general campaign 
of the parties. Nonetheless we are convinced that the analysis presented here is an enrichment 
for the research of elections in multilevel environments.  
References 
Anderson, C. (2006). Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-
Level Analysis, American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 449-463. 
Bruns, A. (2012) How long is a tweet? Mapping dynamic conversation networks on Twitter 
usingGawk and Gephi. Information, Communication & Society 15(9): 1323-1351. 
Bruns, A. and Burgess, J. (2011). #Ausvotes: How Twitter covered the 2010 Australian federal 
elections. Communication, Politics & Culture 4(2): 37-56. 
Budge, I. and Farlie, D. (1983) Explaining and predicting elections. Issue effects and party strategies 
in twenty-three democracies. Londen: George Allen & Unwin. 
Dandoy, R. (2013). Belgium: Toward a Regionalization of National Elections? In Dandoy, R. and 
Schakel, A. (eds.) Regional and National Elections in Western Europe. Territoriality of the Vote in 
Thirteen Countries, Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 47-67. 
Deschouwer, K. (2009). Towards a Regionalization of Statewide Elctoral Trends in Decentralized 
States? The case of Belgium and Spain. In Swenden, W. and Maddens, B. (eds.) Territorial Party 
Politics in Western Europe, Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 31-46. 
Erk and Swenden 2010 Taking stock during times of change In New Directions in federalism 
studies. 
Fabre, E. & Maddens, B. (2009). Verkiezingscycli in meerlagige politieke systemen: België in 
vergelijkend perspectief. Vives beleidspaper nr; 4, maart 2009. 
Hooghe, L., Marks G. and Schakel, A. (2010). The Rise of Regional Authority: A Comparative Study 
of 42 Democracies. London: Routledge. 
Jefferey and Hough (2006). Devolution and electoral politics: where does the UK fit in? in Hough, 
D and Jefferey, C (eds.) Devolution and electoral politics, Machester: Manchester University Press: 
248-256. 
Jeffery, Charlie and Dan Hough (2003). “Regional Elections in Multi-level systems”, European 
Urban and Regional Studies 10(3): 1999-212. 
Joanis, M. (2008). Intertwined Federalism: Accountability Problems under Partial Decentralization. 
Working Paper 08-22 Grédi (Groupe de Récherche en Economie et Développment International. 
Larsson, A.O. and Moe, H. (2012). Studying political microblogging: Twitter users in the 2010 
Swedish election campaign. New Media & Society 14(5): 729-747. 
Maddens, B. (1994) Kiesgedrag en Partijstrategie. De Samenhang Tussen de Beleidsmatige 
Profilering van de Partijen en het Kiesgedrag van de Vlamingen op 24 november 1991. PhD 
thesis, KULeuven, Leuven. 
Pallarés Francesco and Michael Keating (2003). “Regional Electoral Competition. Regional 
Elections and Party Systems in Spain”, European Urban and Regional Studies 10(3): 239-255. 
Petrocik, J. (1996) Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. American 
Journal of Political Science 40: 825-850. 
Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980). Nine Second-Order National Elections. A Conceptual Framework 
for the Analysis of European Election Results, European Journal of Political Research 8: 3-44. 
Romanova, V. (2013). The Principle of Cyclcality of the Second-Order Election Theory for 
Simultaneous Multi-level Elections, Politics 34(2): 161-179. 
Schakel, A. and Dandoy, R. (2013). Conclusion. Regional Elections in Comparative Perspective. In 
Dandoy, R. and Schakel, A. (eds.) Regional and National Elections in Western Europe. Territoriality 
of the Vote in Thirteen Countries, Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 275-299.  
Schakel, A. and Dandoy, R. (2013). Introduction. Territoriality of the Vote: A Framework for 
Analysis. In Dandoy, R. and Schakel, A. (eds.) Regional and National Elections in Western Europe. 
Territoriality of the Vote in Thirteen Countries, Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 1-26.  
Schakel, A. and Jeffery, C. (2013). Are Regional Elections really ‘Second-Order’ Elections?, 
Regional Studies 47 (3): 323-341. 
Swenden, W. and Jans, M. T. (2006). ‘Will it stay or will it go?’ Federalism and the sustainability of 
Belgium, West European Politics 29 (5): 877-894. 
 
Swenden, W. and Maddens, B. (2009). Introduction. Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe: A 
Framework for Analysis. In Swenden, W. and Maddens, B. (eds.) Territorial Party Politics in 
Western Europe, Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 1-30. 
Walgrave, S. & De Swert, K. (2007) Where does issue ownership come from? From the party or 
from the media? Issue-party identifications in Belgium, 1991-2005. In: The Harvard International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 12 (1), 37-67.    
Walgrave, S., Lefevre, J. & Nuytemans, M. (2009). Issue Ownership Stability and Change: How 
Political Parties Claim and Maintain Issues Through Media Appearances. In: Political 
Communication, 26 (2), pp. 153-172. 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 This are the candidates for the federal and Flemish parliament in the constituency Antwerp and for the Flemish 
parliament in East-Flanders. 
ii
 We leave out LDD and PvdA of this comparison because not enough candidates were followed or could be 
followed. 
iii
 Ten of the 59 candidates that were on the list were new candidates who had never been an MP before, three 
candidates were MP in other parliaments than the federal or Flemish parliament. 
